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From Cartel Party to Traditional Membership Organization:  
The Organizational Evolution of Fianna Fáil 
 
 
Abstract: This paper examines patterns of intra-organizational evolution and reform 
of Fianna Fáil as a party organization before and after the 2011 Dáil election, widely 
considered an ‘earthquake election’ that fundamentally undermined Fianna Fáil’s 
status as the dominant party in the Irish party system. Electoral losses had triggered 
reform in Fianna Fáil prior to 2011, but such reforms tended to be minor, as the party 
expected its opposition status to be temporary. This orientation changed after 2011, 
as the party’s very foundation seemed threatened, having suffered a historicdecline 
of its electoral support and membership. We argue that the post-2011 re-orientation 
can be usefully characterized as a movement away from organizational characteristics 
associated with the ‘cartel model of party organization’ towards characteristics 
echoing more ‘traditional mass party structures’, an organizational model less 
dependent on state resources, and more able to generate loyalty through 
organizational means. Whether the 2011 reforms will lead to lasting change is likely 
to depend on whether, and if so how quickly, Fianna Fáil can reclaim its position as 





The 2011 Dáil election was traumatic for Fianna Fáil. Compared to the previous 
election in 2007, the party lost more than half its popular vote, and almost three-
quarters of its seats in parliament. For the first time since the 1920s it was no longer 
the largest party in the Dáil, and was relegated to third place, winning half the number 
of seats of the Labour party. That a once dominant party won half of what was 
historically considered the ‘half’ in the Irish two-and-a-half party system indicated 
how far the party had fallen. While previous electoral losses had triggered reform, 
they tended to be relatively minor, as the party expected its opposition status to be 
temporary. This changed after 2011, because such was the scale of the party’s losses 
and the trauma within the organisation, it motivated a questioning of the party’s 
raison d’etre, which was the spur for an unprecedented level of internal party reform. 
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This post-2011 re-orientation can be usefully described as a movement away from 
organizational characteristics that the theoretical literature associates with the cartel 
model of party organization1 towards characteristics echoing more traditional mass 
party structures.2 While the comparative literature on party organization prominently 
points to a tendency of party organizations in western democracies to move from 
mass to cartel party structures, Fianna Fáil’s evolution moves in the opposite direction.    
 Part of this overall assessment is an evaluation of the intra-organizational 
reforms undertaken by the party after 2011. This includes the introduction of one 
member one vote, the selection of the party leader by an electoral college, and the 
granting to members the authority to decide on coalition participation. We argue that 
although the party grants more rights to members post-2011, this overall reform is 
better understood as a process of enhanced organizational integration, rather than of 
member empowerment. Furthermore, rather than decentralizing decision-making 
power to the party on the ground through enhancing intra-party democracy, it 
effectively shifted power from members of the parliamentary party (the arm of the 
party dominant in the cartel party model) to central office (the arm of the party 
forming the core of mass parties). As this process shifted power away from both TDs 
locally and nationally, it enhanced centralized decision-making. 
 This paper is divided into four sections. First, we describe how Fianna Fáil has 
historically possessed basic cartel party characteristics. Second, we describe how its 
status as a natural party of government, accompanied by access to state funding over 
the last decades, intensified these features and contributed to an increased distancing 
from its extra-parliamentary support base. Third, we assess how party elites prior to 
2011 responded to (short-lived) periods in opposition through organizational reform; 
and fourth, we assess how post-2011 the nature of these reforms changed and how 
they altered the intra-organizational balance in the organization. We conclude with 
                                                        
1 The ‘cartel party’ as a party organizational model defined by intra-organizational features – which 
we refer to here – needs to be distinguished from the concept of a cartel party system as defined by 
inter-party relations (see Bolleyer 2009) not dealt with in this paper. 
2 There is a debate about whether mass parties require a ‘mass’ (i.e. a large number of members), a 
question that, for instance, has been asked with regard to the French Communist Party that has 
relatively few members compared to left-wing parties in other countries.  Treating a mass party as an 
organizational model, however, what we consider decisive is the structural relationships cultivated 




the broader repercussions of our findings and how they connect to insights on party 
reform outside Ireland. 
 
Fianna Fáil: Basic organizational characteristics  
Formed as an extra-parliamentary group, Fianna Fáil originally placed great emphasis 
on its organization ‘on the ground’, with local branches (cumainn) providing the 
foundations of its powerful grass-roots appeal. Aiming to establish a cumann in every 
parish, by November 1926, within six months of its foundation, the party had 460 
branches, a figure that had more than doubled another six months later (Dunphy, 
1995: 82). Fianna Fáil’s militant organizational skills owed something to the adoption 
of the rural networks of the old IRA, stemming from the 1919–21 revolutionary war. 
Indeed, the IRA veterans constituted a large section of the thousands of unpaid 
volunteers who helped found the nationwide network of branches, and canvassed 
intensely to build up the party (Dunphy, 1995: 74-5).  
 This organization was invaluable to Fianna Fáil in its becoming the dominant 
party of the Irish political system (Mair, 1987a: 135). It provided Fianna Fáil with an 
army and network of volunteers come election time. Initially, the party machine was 
therefore strongly attached to the cumann rather than local notables, and the 
importance of organization over personality was stressed (Carty, 1981: 105). Dunphy 
(1995: 75) points to the requirement of Fianna Fáil candidates to resign if requested 
by two-thirds of the party national executive as an example of the triumph of the 
organization over the party in public office or those aspiring to form part of it. The 
approximately 3,000 cumainn within the organization that the party sustained into 
the 1980s were an invaluable resource for the party in keeping abreast of local issues, 
and one seasoned observer described the cumainn as the ‘eyes and ears of the party’ 
(Walsh, 1986: 65). This allowed Fianna Fáil to claim that it knew what the people were 
thinking, while the local cumainn simultaneously served as the party’s ‘mouthpiece’ 
(Walsh, 1986: 65) to transmit messages on policy and strategy to its grass-roots 
members.  
 Treating Fianna Fáil as an organization from a cross-national 
perspective, despite its emphasis on organization, Fianna Fáil never resembled a mass 
party with clearly defined organizational boundaries aimed at reinforcing members’ 
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ideological commitment, from which loyal candidates were recruited, steered by a 
strong party in central office, integrating and exercising some control over local 
membership organizations and over the party in public office. First, Fianna Fáil, as was 
the case for most Irish parties (Chubb, 1992: 102), was quite a decentralized body up 
until recent decades, with the party in central office being quite weak and having little 
influence over local branches. Second, candidates were not necessarily recruited from 
these branches, the primary function of which seemed to be to serve as campaign 
organizations. Third, there was never a case of a strong commitment to ideology 
(Mair, 1987a).  
Although the party’s ‘cartel party features’ became particularly pronounced 
when government access started to be complemented by the availability of generous 
direct state funding, its extra-parliamentary organization was characterized by cartel 
party features long before such funding was introduced. While the literature 
commonly points to parties’ dependency on direct state funding as a central (and easy 
to measure) indicator of party and party system cartelization, going back to central 
theoretical contributions, other state resources such as those provided through public 
office (e.g. government) are considered as functionally equivalent in that they make – 
as does direct state funding – the cultivation of stable societal support and the 
formation of a strong extra-parliamentary infrastructure underpinning it less 
necessary (Katz and Mair 1995; 2002).3 Importantly, Fianna Fáil’s ability to rely on 
government resources started only a few years after its formation, as it governed 
uninterrupted from 1932 to 1948. Consequently, if the formation of an organization, 
able to recruit loyal members and candidates for office without having to resort to 
selective payoffs, is incentivized by the exclusion from state institutions able to 
provide such payoffs (Duverger, 1964), it is unsurprising that Fianna Fáil – while 
building an organization – did not invest in mass party structures. It defined its 
membership boundaries much more broadly than traditional mass parties, which 
historically had strong, clearly delineated extra-parliamentary membership 
organizations.4 Within Fianna Fáil, it was cumainn who were responsible for recruiting 
                                                        
3 See for a critique of the concept Koole (1996). 
4 The characterization of Fianna Fáil does not mean that the party did not define itself as a 
community, but that it did not use organizational means to demarcate its boundaries. 
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and registering members, a task they were not very enamoured with, except when 
selection conventions came around. This meant that details on Fianna Fáil 
membership were historically never clear, which did not seem to matter a great deal, 
as formal membership was not required to avail of the patronage the party had to 
dispense (Chubb, 1972: 91). With low costs for organizational entry, an open 
organization to draw in support from all corners of society, and a flexible and strategic 
recruitment of non-members as candidates for public office, it traditionally most 
resembled the cartel model of party organization, predating the ascendency of such 
organizational tendencies in parties in other west European democracies (Detterbeck, 
2005; Bolleyer, 2009).  
For decades, membership in a formal sense often did not even exist. 
Deliberately defining itself as a movement rather than a party, Fianna Fáil did not 
pursue a strategy of mass incorporation, but tried to penetrate civil society as far as 
possible, which made it necessary to be as inclusive as possible. Before internal 
reforms that began in the 1990s, following a commission that deliberated for three 
years, party members did not need to pay a membership fee, and the party had no 
centralised membership register until the post-2011 period (Carty, 1981: 105; Mair, 
1987a: 102, 114–6; Mair, 1987b). Similarly, party membership formed no precondition 
to run under the party’s label, and candidates or TDs had no obligation to formally join 
the organization after election. Recruitment thus had a strong element of self-
selection, with Fianna Fáil as an organization having relatively little control over who 
joined and left its ranks.  
Naturally, the control capacities of a party and the means it employs to 
generate loyalty and stabilize its support base need not be located inside its 
organization, that is, need not be achieved by strategies such as selective recruitment 
of loyal members and office aspirants as associated with the mass party model (Katz 
and Mair, 1995: 99–100). Extra-organizational means of control, such as resources 
controlled by the party leadership and desired by its representatives and followers 
alike, most notably government patronage closely associated with the cartel party 
model, can be equally effective to generate and sustain support. Their disadvantage 
is obvious though: if resource access (e.g. through government participation) is not 
secure, organizational stability is easily threatened.  
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As is discussed in the following section, this was for a long time no real concern 
to Fianna Fáil as the natural party of government. During long periods of near 
permanent government access pre-existing cartel party features such as the 
permeable organizational boundaries just described were reinforced. At the same 
time, the party became increasingly dominated by its public representatives, and 
Fianna Fáil became increasingly disconnected from its organizational network outside 
government, elements even more central to the cartel party model (Katz and Mair, 
1996: 527; Katz and Mair, 2002: 122).  
 
Fianna Fáil as party of government: the reinforcement of cartel party structures 
A central factor that facilitated the ascendency of the party in public office within 
Fianna Fáil as an organization was its dominant position in achieving access to national 
government. It was in power from 1957 to 1973, and following a period of alternation 
between Fine Gael-led and Fianna Fáil governments, yet again experienced near 
permanency in government from 1987 up to its electoral decline in the 2011 election. 
In the latter period, the party leader, beginning with Charles Haughey, but later 
continued by Bertie Ahern, used his ability to negotiate agreements with trade union 
social partners to maintain support among the working and lower middle classes 
(McGraw, 2015: 142). Fianna Fáil’s dominant and ongoing access to government 
afforded the party considerable resources, and gave the party in public office access 
to patronage in the form of ministerial resource access and powers of appointment 
(Carty, 1981: 108). While the distribution of local spoils can be used to stabilise TDs’ 
positions locally, ministers not only control political appointments (such as ministerial 
advisers), but also appointments to state boards and public bodies (for example, 
hospital boards, port and docks companies, or governing boards of universities). These 
bodies were a particularly important pool of patronage goods as ministers had 
complete discretion over them, as they are created by ministers, and are fully or 
partially financed by the government. For example, the number of appointments to 
these bodies between 1997 and 2006 was over 7,000 (Clancy and O’Connor 2011: 6).    
That the number of public bodies themselves increased from 130 in 1998 to 
approximately 600 in 2011 – a period in which Fianna Fáil governed continuously – 
indicates the growing usage of patronage as a resource to generate support through 
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extra-organizational means (Bolleyer, 2009: 572). Underlining this, a recent study 
suggests that patronage in Ireland has been primarily used to reward support (rather 
than as a tool to exercise policy control over the administration) (O’Malley et al., 2012). 
While ministerial advisers are replaced when the government changes, this is not the 
case regarding posts on state boards. New appointments can only be made if posts 
become vacant, and party supporters keep their positions when their party loses 
power. The relevance of these resources becomes particularly evident when 
government parties are concerned about losing office. Just before or immediately 
after elections they fill all vacancies to use their access as far and as widely as possible 
– again a dynamic observed before the 2007 election, for instance, when the outgoing 
Fianna Fáil–Progressive Democrat coalition made 400 appointments to state boards 
(Bolleyer, 2009: 572), and in 2011 when the Fianna Fáil–Green government made 182 
appointments in its last few months (Irish Independent, 14 April 2011). This ensured 
Fianna Fáil still profited from long periods in power after an electoral defeat. Fianna 
Fáil’s dominance could thereby outlast shorter periods in opposition, as long as its 
elites were confident they would regain power soon enough.5  
This perceived self-sufficiency of the party in public office due to government 
resources, to which the party has had extensive access to since 1932, led, over time, 
to a growing distance between it and the party organization, as the interest of public 
office-holders started to dominate the party (Gallagher 2010: 131-2). It is indicative 
that the party’s constitution prior to the post-2011 reforms presented the 
parliamentary party as separate from the organization outside public office, rather 
than considering it as a subsection of the party organization as an overarching 
structure integrating the different arms operating inside and outside public 
institutions (this is not purely symbolic, as it changed after 2011). This self-
understanding of the party elite was also mirrored in in-depth interviews conducted 
by Cross and Blais, indicating that ‘members see their party as one of government and 
are accordingly deferential to the parliamentary party in all internal party decision-
making’ (2012: 140). 
                                                        
5 This is not meant to suggest that Fianna Fáil policies were implemented when the party was out of 
office, but that this continuity helped to stabilize the party’s support base. 
8 
 
 The ascendency of the party in public office was reinforced by the onset of 
substantial state subsidies that went into national party coffers, which made it even 
more self-sufficient. This began with the introduction of state-funded personal 
assistants in 1975, and in 1981 parties were allocated staff for administrative and 
research purposes (Mair, 1987a: 137). Later on, more substantial funding was 
provided under the 1997 Electoral Act, which Fianna Fáil challenged when being in 
opposition, but did little to alter once back in office. As all the parties had faced 
mounting private debts in the 1980s and the 1990s, the state funding came as a 
welcome relief, but also increased their dependency on this source. Fianna Fáil, 
traditionally strongly depending on private donations6, now grew to rely much more 
on state funds. With the amount allocated based on electoral strength, the strategic 
priority of winning elections became even more important to sustain essential party 
finances.  
It is important to note that the process that shifted power to the party in public 
office was accompanied by a strengthening of the national party generally. The party 
central office had been historically weak because the local branches did not see the 
necessity of a large central office and so were not willing to fund it. This relationship 
began to change in the 1960s when the central organization slowly acquired 
resources,7 which was reinforced by the introduction of the aforementioned direct 
state funding. Lacking a clear delineation between the party in public office and the 
central organization strengthened the former, as central office was generally 
answerable to the party leadership (Farrell, 1995: 224).  
 While dominant government access and generous state funding strengthened 
the arm of the party operating within public institutions, echoing classical arguments 
in cartel party theory (Katz and Mair, 1995; 2002), more subtle changes in the 
relationship between individual TDs and their local organizations weakened the extra-
parliamentary party. This, yet again, reinforced the dominant position of public office-
                                                        
6 Murphy and Farrell point out, based on data from 1998, that Fianna Fáil and Sinn Féin were the 
parties which received the highest amounts of private funding (2002: 230– 31). 
7 In 1966, it employed six full-time staff on a combined salary of £5,000. In 1977, the party employed 
ten staff on a budget of £40,000. In 1973 it appointed a research director and a press officer. By 1985, 
there were 18 working in head office and 12 in the Oireachtas offices of the party (Mair, 1987a: 108).  
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holders – now as individual actors – in the organization, thereby weakening the party’s 
connection to those followers not forming part of TDs’ personal networks. 
While the organization had kept its organizational boundaries permeable for 
decades, the emergence of personal power bases shifted loyalty away from the 
organization as a whole to a more individualistic and short-lived foundation – 
something identified by Carty (2004) as the ‘franchise party model’. TDs and ministers 
developed their own local machine independent of the party organization instead of 
being part of it, perhaps best typified by the party leader, Bertie Ahern, and his 
‘Drumcondra Mafia’ machine in the Dublin Central constituency. As one of Ahern’s 
supporters recalled: ‘We weren’t even really Fianna Fáilers – we were Bertie people. 
Our people weren’t traditional party people. They came in on a personal basis’ (Leahy, 
2009: 17). This development corresponded to incentives generated by the electoral 
system. Under single transferable vote (STV), voters can rank candidates running in a 
multi-member constituency, which introduces a strong element of intra-party 
competition, especially within Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael. This made the issue of 
candidate selection strategy especially important within parties, given the significant 
effect it could have on the number of seats returned. The traditionally decentralized 
nature of Irish parties, with Fianna Fáil being no different, meant that central office 
had little control over selection conventions, which were the fiefdom of local branches, 
and predominantly a few local elites, generally local TDs or councillors. Consequently, 
Fianna Fáil sometimes ran too many candidates, thus splitting the vote, or had a poor 
vote management strategy, which resulted in considerable tension between the party 
in central office and local branches increasingly built around TDs’ individual networks, 
who jointly constituted the party in public office (Carty, 1981: 24; Gallagher, 1988: 
129–30).  
This constellation inevitably shaped individual TDs’ organization-building 
strategies, leading to Fianna Fáil’s development into a network of local organizations 
built around individual candidates rather than an integrated party organization 
constituted by local branches able to outlive individual candidates and office-holders. 
Reinforced by the party’s historically fluid boundaries – defined by voters’ affiliation 
to the republican cause rather than demarcated organizationally (e.g. through a 
formal membership fee or a probation phase) – party machines around individual 
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incumbents or candidates blossom and die. Supporters of a particular TD only faced 
low costs to exit a network, inviting organizational instability, if TDs’ electoral fortunes 
decline or suitable candidates cannot be found. TDs and supporters were not linked 
through a shared commitment to the same organization and this worked both ways, 
as until the post-2011 reforms, party membership formed no precondition for running 
under the party’s label and candidates or elected TDs had no obligation to join, 
echoing the separation between the ‘party’ (i.e. the parliamentary party) and the 
‘organization’ in the party’s constitution pre-2011 mentioned earlier.  
 Near-permanent government access and state funding (strengthening the 
position of the party in public office towards the extra-parliamentary organization) 
and the personalization of party networks (strengthening the position of individual 
TDs locally at the cost of the extra-parliamentary organization) pushed Fianna Fáil in 
similar directions: They further contributed to a reinforcement of office as the party’s 
dominant goal – even though the pursuit of winning as many seats as possible aimed 
for by the national party and the pursuit of a TD or candidate to win a particular seat 
at times were in conflict with each other given the nature of the electoral system. This, 
in turn, shifted power to the parliamentary party/party in government as the core of 
Fianna Fáil’s organization. For a period, the prioritization of government office as the 
primary aim and its exploitation contributed to the party’s electoral success, 
confirming some party elites’ belief that the cultivation of local ties might be 
dispensable. This is also visible in the nature of reforms prior to 2011. 
 
Organizational reform in Fianna Fáil before and after 2011 
Intra-party reform before 2011: Modifications of a cartel party organization 
Naturally, elites’ interest in the extra-parliamentary organization and the awareness 
of Fianna Fáil’s detachment from its followers tended to be most pronounced when 
the party lost government office. While these reforms tended to strengthen ties to 
the local level and to enhance central organizational control, prior to the 2011 
electoral shock, they remained directed towards improving the party’s electoral 
fortunes in the short term, rather than significantly altering the position of the extra-
parliamentary organization vis-à-vis the party in public office (Carty, 1981: 108; 
Bolleyer, 2009).  
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 Following its losing office in 1973 after sixteen continuous years in a single-
party government, for instance, a new general secretary, assisted by a new press 
officer and a full-time research director, set about modernizing and professionalizing 
the party to ensure its spell in opposition was to be short-lived. As this required a more 
centralized approach, or organizing and managing elections, they sought to curb the 
influence of local elites, and thereby implement a nationally coordinated electoral 
strategy. To this purpose, the party closed down paper cumainn, ghost branches 
created by local incumbents to maintain their control of the organization at the grass-
roots level. This challenge arose from the delegate-based system that operated within 
Fianna Fáil. Each cumann sent a number of delegates to selection conventions and ard 
fheiseanna (national conferences), which encouraged an abuse of the system as local 
TDs created paper cumainn so that they could stack local conventions and ensure not 
just their re-selection, but also a weak running mate (as under Single Transferable 
Vote, the Irish electoral system,intra-party competition was the most common reason 
for the electoral defeat of an incumbent). Thus, Fianna Fáil’s post-1973 reforms 
resulted in the closure of 100 such paper cumainn in 1976, including 80 in the county 
of Donegal between 1973 and 1977 (Mair, 1987a: 119). This rationalization was 
accompanied by the development of a nationally coordinated electoral strategy, 
which likewise required the central organization to exert more influence over local 
branches, particularly in the area of candidate selection. While this had traditionally 
been a decentralized affair within Fianna Fáil, the party leader managed to impose 16 
candidates for the 1977 election, including six women (Mair, 1987a: 132). 
 In the period between 1987 and up to the earthquake election of 2011 the 
party was in opposition only once: 1994–97. In this period, under a new leader, Bertie 
Ahern, the party engaged in reforms to strengthen its extra-parliamentary structures 
as it had done during earlier periods in opposition. Measures included a renewed 
attempt to form a national membership database, after a failed effort to produce a 
computerised register in the 1980s. The party again engaged in local reform (e.g. the 
closing of paper branches) – a recurring strategy in times of opposition to increase 
national control – and intensified ties to local party structures. Ahern met local party 
cumainn to restore the number of active branches and to set up a network with local 
activists and interest groups. The number of party staff, which had decreased between 
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1990 and 1994 when Fianna Fáil was in government (following its high point during 
the conflict-ridden 1980s), increased again after 1994 (Murphy and Farrell, 2002: 233). 
Interestingly, a general pattern pre-2011 was that the resources of party headquarters 
were systematically strengthened when the party was in opposition. This indicated 
the party’s efforts to increase intra-organizational control capacities, but it also 
reflected a strengthening of the party in central office as the parliamentary party lost 
power and, with it, its weakened ability to rely on government resources. 
 A number of internal party reports commissioned following the worst local 
election results in the party’s history in 2004 highlighted the potential long-term costs 
of neglecting the party organization outside public office and thus the costs of 
reforming its organization solely for the purpose of enhancing short-term electoral 
fortunes. These reports, however, were of little consequence. The first such report, 
written by deputy leader Brian Cowen, painted a gloomy picture for Fianna Fáil, of it 
being a rural, elderly and inactive organization. Almost half of its active members were 
over 55 years of age, one quarter of cumainn were inactive, and 50 per cent of them 
met just once a year or less (Reid, 2005). In addition, almost 60 per cent of cumainn 
had attracted no new members in three years. The report said that active cumainn 
‘actively discourage new members joining the party’, as local notables preferred to 
keep the cumainn stuffed with their supporters. This echoed a similar internal report 
from 1999 that had criticised paper cumainn, which it said served ‘only the interests 
of a power bloc within a constituency organization’, and can act as a deterrent to 
potential members wishing to join the party (Rafter, 1999).  
 Overall, little was done on foot of either of these reports, however, as energies 
were focused on securing re-election. Following an even worse local election result in 
2009, which precipitated what was to come in 2011, two further internal reports were 
commissioned, one for Dublin, chaired by Chris Flood, a former junior minister, and 
another for outside the capital, chaired by former minister Gerard Collins. The picture 
these reports painted was no better than the Cowen report five years earlier. Although 
Cowen himself was now at the helm as party leader, Fianna Fáil was in crisis 
management for much of his leadership, as the country was in the middle of an 
economic recession. Consequently, reform of the party was sidelined once again. 
Despite the growing awareness of the vulnerability of Fianna Fáil’s extra-
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parliamentary structures, the party let the cumann-based system and the grass-roots 
organizations linked to them become ever more moribund, with it being especially 
weak in urban areas. Many cumainn were simply not active, particularly in Dublin, 
which had become a waste ground for the party (McGee, 2011).8 .  
 Interestingly, dominant government access itself was one argument used by 
party elites to resist any participatory reforms earlier on – despite Fine Gael, the 
Greens, the Progressive Democrats and Labour having decided to involve their 
members in the selection of their party leaders years earlier. As late as 2008, Fianna 
Fáil officials still suggested that their ‘party is unique in that when choosing a leader it 
is also choosing a Taoiseach and that as such the choice should be restricted to the 
parliamentary party’ (Cross and Blais, 2012: 139). The 2011 election would change this 
self-perception dramatically. 
 
The 2011 electoral shock: Away from cartel party structures towards a traditional 
membership organization 
Electoral defeat in 2011 traumatised Fianna Fáil. It constituted an ‘external shock’ 
sufficiently severe to trigger significant organizational reforms aimed at countering 
the national party elites’ neglect of Fianna Fáil’s organization. These reforms were 
more profound than those earlier, as they shifted the party away from its ‘cartel party 
structure’ that it could afford, and which had intensified, so long as it had frequent 
and reliable access to government resources and plenty of state funding. With the 
party losing 57 of its 77 seats in 2011, and its first preference vote collapsing by 25 
percentage points, a direct consequence of these losses was a significant cut in state 
funding. For example, Fianna Fáil received €5,200,780 of exchequer funding in 2010, 
but this fell to €3,091,818 in 2011 and €2,842,259 in 2012 (Standards in Public Office, 
various years). More than one third of the party’s staff in central office were made 
redundant. 
In essence, electoral decline was drastic and the loss of government could not 
anymore be interpreted as a temporary affair. Fine Gael, Labour, and the Greens had 
already given their members a say in candidate and leadership selection, with the 
                                                        
8 In the Dublin South-East constituency, for example, it was estimated that just three out of 30 
cumann were active. 
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primary motivation being to strengthen and reinvigorate their organizational base 
having experienced electoral set-backs of their own. This meant that Fianna Fáil met 
all three conditions that earlier studies identified as crucial for party elites to adopt 
reform that they should naturally resist, that is, those that potentially diminish their 
own decision-making power: availability of contagion, opposition status and electoral 
defeat (Cross and Blais, 2012: 136). Furthermore, decline in support also showed in 
party membership figures, which had been raised as a concern in internal reports for 
some time (see above). Those were naturally very changeable given the party’s 
permeable boundaries; for instance, membership figures declined from 90,000 in 
1979 to 65,000 in 1983, returning to 89,000 in 1989. However, in the 2000s the party 
experienced a historic drop from 65,000 (2008) to 18,000 in 2012 (Weeks, 2014), the 
year after the 2011 electoral disaster. This signaled very clearly that the party’s crisis 
was not only one of electoral performance, but fundamentally threatened its societal 
underpinning. 
Further evidence of the party’s decline was its decision not to field a candidate 
for the presidential election in 2011, significant given that Fianna Fáil had won every 
presidential election bar the 1990 contest. The party had just one new TD elected in 
2011, no female TDs, no TDs in Dublin, and was finding it difficult to attract candidates, 
in part due to the cumann-based system controlled by local TDs which, as discussed 
in a number of the aforementioned internal reports, discouraged some people from 
joining. The need for structural reform within Fianna Fáil was obvious. 
 The most visible reforms passed (at least formally) significant decision-making 
power on to party members. These included the introduction of the one member one 
vote (OMOV) system for candidate selection conventions, the selection of the leader 
by an electoral college, and giving the power to decide on whether to join coalition 
government to a national conference of members. On the one hand, these reforms 
re-integrated members into organizational decision-making by giving them a direct 
say about candidate, leader selection and government participation, and aimed at 
15 
 
counteracting their disconnect with the national party. On the other hand, these 
reforms took significant powers out of the hands of the party in public office.9  
A second set of reforms involved strengthening the central party organization 
in its control capacities towards members and towards the parliamentary party, both 
of which were in turn subjected to more explicit obligations (for members a formal 
fee and probation period, and for public office holders new ethics rules). These 
reforms make clear that the empowerment of members such as through OMOV may 
not be equated with a uniform shift towards a more decentralized party structure. 
Instead it was coupled with an enhanced integration of and control over the different 
arms of the party, the party on the ground (the members) and the party in public office 
(the TDs), under a strengthened central organization.  
In conjunction with each other, these two sets of reforms shifted Fianna Fáil 
away from its dominant cartel party features, a party organization predominantly 
existing within public institutions sustained by its close relationship with the state, 
towards mass party structures, a type of organization sustained by voluntary labour 
and fee-paying members, but embedded in a party hierarchy steered by a strong 
central office (Katz and Mair, 1995: 20). 
 
The post-2011 reforms – empowering party members? 
In terms of where to begin, Fianna Fáil had a number of blueprints for reform ready 
to implement, given the number of internal party reports it had commissioned over 
the previous decades. Having observed the positive changes of OMOV for the other 
parties in Ireland, such a reform seemed the obvious starting-point for Fianna Fáil. 
Such a change would also have a financial benefit, a not altogether minor 
consequence, given the reduction in the party’s state funding following on from 2011. 
To re-establish ties to local party structures, the party leader, Micheál Martin, 
travelled the country, addressing each of the party’s 43 constituency organizations, 
the Comhairlí Dáil Cheantair. Renewal committees were also set up in each 
constituency, while a special task force was created for Dublin. Former minister Mary 
                                                        
9 This is distinct from OMOV being used as a means to disempower activists in favour of more passive 
(and easy to manipulate) rank and file members, a feature associated with the cartel party model 
(Katz and Mair 1995). 
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Hanafin ran an intiative to attract more female members. Party headquarters also 
circulated proposals for reform amongst cumainn and the party membership, and 
invited submissions, close to 1,000 of which they received. The feedback from 
members was summarised in the following points presented at the 2012 ard fheis: 
 
• Fianna Fáil must radically change the way it operates and must increase 
its on-the-ground activities;  
• The cumann must remain the foundation stone of the party. Members 
want it to be the key connection between the organization and the 
community and wish it to be opened up and empowered.  
• Individual members must be the driving force of Fianna Fáil and there 
must be an end to the ‘top-down’ approach.  
• Members strongly support empowering members through the 
introduction of one-member, one-vote (OMOV).  
• Reforms are required in the work of the Ard Chomhairle [national 
executive], Headquarters and the Parliamentary Party. These reforms 
must result in improved communications at all levels and must give 
members a greater say in the running of the Party.  
• Members want to have a role in the election of the Party Leader.  
• Members want to be consulted in advance of the party entering 
government.  
• Members want Fianna Fáil to have a strong ethics code which leaves no 
doubt that conduct which brings the party into disrepute will not be 
tolerated. (Fianna Fáil, 2012: 2) 
 
Following these submissions, four core groups of amendments were put forward for 
inclusion in the party’s constitution at the 2012 ard fheis (Fianna Fáil, 2012). These 
concerned measures to: implement OMOV; increase political activity; increase the 
activities and accountability of the parliamentary party, the national executive and 
central office; and ensure high ethical standards. With Fianna Fáil being the last party 
yet to introduce OMOV, and given the manner in which the grass-roots had been 
marginalised in recent decades, not to mention the failing structure of the cumann, 
there was overwhelming support among the membership for OMOV. Although 
discussed behind closed doors at the ard fheis, there was very little dissent to its 
introduction, albeit there was some debate about its mechanics. As it transpired, 
OMOV was to be used for all intra-party decisions: for internal party meetings and 
selection conventions, allowing members have the say on whether Fianna Fáil enters 
a coalition government after an election, and selecting party leaders. All paid-up 
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members are entitled to attend, speak and vote at meetings of the ard fheis, their 
cumann, their constituency organisation and to a vote in all candidate selection 
conventions in their constituency, which all members are entitled to contest. Anyone 
not paying their membership fee would have no voting rights and would be classified 
as associate members. This implies that this new form of empowered membership 
came with an element of responsibility (see the next section below).  
The second major reform initiated by Fianna Fáil was to give its membership 
the right to decide on whether to enter coalition government. This had been mooted 
in 2012, and at the 2013 ard fheis a motion was passed which states that if the Fianna 
Fáil leader recommends the party enter into coalition, ‘a draft programme for 
government must be presented to voting members of the organization for approval 
at a special ard fheis before any such government can be formed’ (Kelly, 2015). Voting 
is to be by OMOV to accept or reject the draft programme, and it needs a majority in 
favour for the party to enter government. All the other Irish parties, with the exception 
of Fine Gael, already had a similar mechanism in place.  As a part of reforms to 
empower the membership, this decision was an obvious and inevitable change. Just 
as with the discussion on OMOV a year earlier, the motion to approve it not 
surprisingly met with little opposition. The consequences of this power were realised 
within a few years, as at the 2015 ard fheis members passed motions ruling out 
participation in a coalition with Fine Gael, and one in which Fianna Fáil is the junior 
partner. Even though the motions were not binding, it let the parliamentary party 
know of the attitude of the members towards such coalition arrangements. This was 
particularly relevant a year later following the 2016 Dáil election, when even though 
the seat arithmetic suggested a Fine Gael-Fianna Fáil coalition was the only obvious 
electoral arrangement, the Fianna Fáil parliamentary party refused this option, with 
the opposition of its party membership being a stated key factor behind this decision. 
Consequently, Fianna Fáil stayed formally in opposition, facilitating the formation of a 
Fine Gael minority government. 
 The third major reform concerned how the party picked its leader. The party’s 
national executive recommended to the 2015 ard fheis an electoral college whose 
members would each have one vote, deciding by the single transferable vote. Voting 
can be by postal ballot or by person, with a special ard fheis to be convened to pick 
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the party leader. Party members comprise 45 per cent of the college, TDs 40 per cent, 
with senators, MEPs, local councillors and members of the ard comhairle comprising 
the remaining 15 per cent. While this resembles the leadership selection mechanism 
adopted by Fine Gael in 2004 following an electoral defeat in 2002 (Cross and Blais, 
2012: 139), Fianna Fáil’s voting weights are more favorable to members). While in 
Fianna Fáil members have relatively more weight than the TDs in the final selection 
stage, candidate nomination still privileges TDs, and only allows members of the 
parliamentary party to run as leader: only a Fianna Fáil TD holding the party whip and 
with the support of at least five Fianna Fáil TDs is eligible to be nominated. This motion 
came at a time when the party leadership was under some strain, as it struggled to 
make an impact in the opinion polls, stagnating between 18 and 20 per cent of the 
national vote. While this process has not been implemented to date, the formal rules 
already suggest that it represents an instance of managed democratization, whereby 
the selectorate is expanded to (also) include members but the process prior to the 
final decision – determining the choices available – remains dominated by party elites 
(Aylott and Bolin 2016: 2–4). Unsurprisingly, the motion was passed with little dissent. 
 
The post-2011 reforms – strengthening of the central party and party integration 
The three reforms formally strengthening the rights of members might lead us to 
expect the balance of power to have swung back towards the grass-roots of the party. 
However, paradoxically, the democratization of the branch structure actually 
strengthened – in some areas– centralizing tendencies in the party. This is because 
the reform lessened the ability of local TDs to maintain a hold over the local 
organization via an abuse of the cumann-based system of delegation. The 
constituency bosses who had previously controlled selection conventions, much to 
the chagrin of the national party, now had far less power but this did not mean that 
members were necessarily more empowered. The power shifted from individual TDs 
with their personalized local networks to the national party. The opening up of the 
selection process strengthened the power of central office as it finally wrested control 
of the process from cumainn. So while it might have seemed as if the post-2011 
reforms dispersed power within the party by empowering members, instead the 
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reforms integrated the party organization more and thereby shifted power from the 
party in public (both locally and nationally) to the party in central office.10 
This becomes particularly clear in the area of candidate selection. In many 
selection conventions for the 2016 Dáil election, members had no opportunity to vote 
for candidates. A considerable number of candidates were selected unopposed (i.e. 
members were denied the option of a choice), due to a combination of central party 
directives and the carving up of constituencies for electoral purposes. In part this 
increased centralization was necessitated by the decline in support for the party, and 
its weakened ability to attract lower preferences, which meant the party had to adopt 
a much tighter selection strategy. It had lost a number of seats in 2011 because it had 
run too many candidates. Consequently, the party ran its fewest candidates ever for 
local elections in 2014, and its fewest candidates ever for Dáil elections in 2016.  
This centralized strategy could also be justified more easily due to obligations 
under the new gender quota legislation, which required the party to have a nationally 
coordinated strategy to ensure it had 30 per cent female candidates, otherwise it 
would have had its state funding reduced by 50 per cent. The necessity of such 
management was highlighted by the party’s failure to make the voluntary 30 per cent 
quota for the 2014 local elections. So, for example, central office issued directives to 
some local constituencies to pick just a female candidate, with in some cases there 
being only one, ensuring no vote took place at the convention. This was not without 
controversy at the local level, and resulted in one male aspirant in the Dublin Central 
constituency unsuccessfully taking a court case against the constitutionality of the 
gender quota legislation. 
 In this context, the reform of the branch and membership structure within the 
party gave central office enhanced power because it now had direct access to the 
members. The central organization had for decades desired this change, only to be 
resisted by the local party bosses who could not be bypassed. Under the old cumann-
based system, there was no centralized party membership list, which meant that the 
                                                        
10 We understand power here as the intra-organizational control over core arenas of intra-party 
decision-making considered in light of the party’s opposition status. The assessment might change if 
the party entered government office, as then a new set of actors – ministers and possibly a Taoiseach 
– come in, who might start again to dominate areas such as policy-making. 
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national headquarters were very much dependent on information supplied to it from 
cumainn, which often was not very forthcoming. Members can now either join the 
party via a cumann or via central office, which then directs such members to their 
nearest cumann, or in the case of Dublin, constituency organization, as the old 
cumann structure has been rendered largely redundant in the capital. The means that 
central office now has control of party membership, the consequences of which are 
manifold. From a practical point of view, paid-up membership provides a new source 
of revenue for the national organisation, estimated at €400,000 per annum (Farrell 
and Little, 2013: 9).  
The new system affords central office a much greater level of knowledge about 
the party membership and thereby allows it to exert more influence, which as 
mentioned is particularly evident at selection conventions. Central office maintains 
control of the electoral register for such conventions; it controls the timing of 
conventions and picks the date for nominations; it decides how many candidates are 
to be selected; it decides on how the constituency is to be divided in terms of 
candidate representation; and it ultimately decides how many candidates to run. An 
example of such developments occurred in the selection convention for Longford for 
the 2016 Dáil election. Central office issued a directive that the convention pick a sole 
female candidate, in effect ensuring that Connie Gerety-Quinn was selected without 
a vote, as the other two candidates were both male. This caused uproar, with one of 
the male candidates, Pat O’Rourke, stating ‘HQ have reneged and turned their back 
on Longford. Longford Fianna Fáil will exercise their democratic right’ (O’Connell, 
2015). The chair of the convention, Seán Fleming TD, when defending the decision 
tellingly referred to the national executive committee having ‘more information and 
access to more information than the organizations in each of the 40 constituencies’ 
(Loughlin, 2015).   
Thus, the introduction of OMOV in candidate selection has to be seen in 
conjunction with a more centralized control over membership, which made it more 
(rather than less) difficult to mobilise against the central party decisions (especially as 
the latter could refer to the external constraints of the new gender quota legislation). 
While the old cumann-based system was rotten and in need of reform, the new 
priority on members over delegates and branches has not unambiguously 
21 
 
strengthened the grass-roots of the organization. With power to control nominations 
and conventions no longer in the hands of local TDs, a further obstacle to central office 
wielding its muscle is removed. Despite the rhetoric and the apparent increased role 
of the grass-roots membership, power wielded by the central office has continued to 
grow.  
In sum, the opposition of the party membership to government participation, 
as linked to members’ new post-2011 veto rights in this area, was a significant factor 
in the party’s decision to facilitate a Fine Gael minority government rather than taking 
over ministerial responsibility themselves in a formal coalition. However, in the area 
of candidate selection, the reality in many cases indicates the limited nature of 
members’ role and the enhanced power of central office. The latter controlled the 
process in such a manner that members were denied a vote in a significant number of 
cases, lessening the importance of the reforms.  
 Another indication of the altered role of the party in central office and the shift 
in Fianna Fáil towards mass party features is visible in the enhanced focus on 
obligations in the revised constitution, obligations that both applied to individual 
members as well as public office holders. Compared to cartel parties, mass parties 
have elaborate extra-parliamentary structures that are not deferential towards 
parliament and its representatives (Duverger, 1964: 190). Instead, MPs are considered 
as delegates whose ‘status as members of the party’s ‘inner circle’ takes precedence 
over their status as members of parliament’ (Duverger, 1964: 202), and as 
representatives are accountable to members (Katz and Mair, 1995: 18). It is thus 
indicative that the ability of the central party to discipline members – including those 
holding party or representative functions – was expanded considerably, which 
specified rule violations much more precisely, as well as giving central office a broader 
arsenal of sanctions. This needs to be seen in the context of another new provision, 
namely that candidates for public office (and thus TDs) have to become party 
members themselves, while formerly they could stay outside of the organization, a 
reform measure that stresses that members of different functional units of the party 
(the cumann or the parliamentary party) ought to form part of the same overall party 
organization coordinated by central office. Public office-holders not only have to form 
part of, but also are closely linked to, the extra-parliamentary organization and their 
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members outside institutions through new accountability mechanisms. For once, TDs 
were made subject to new ethics rules and are now answerable to the party’s national 
executive when breaching standards of conduct (Article 59). Furthermore, they have 
to meet members at least twice a year (Article 58, Fianna Fáil, Córú & Rialacha), and 
need to consult with members and units on policy development (Article 57). While 
these provisions offer ‘participatory opportunities but no real authority to the broader 
membership’ (Cross, 2016: 16), they are relevant as they visibly and formally break 
with the formerly dominant view (enshrined in the pre-2011 constitution) that the 
parliamentary party is the embodiment of the party and the centre of internal 
decision-making (Cross and Blais, 2012: 140).   
The increasing focus on obligations equally concerns members (including TDs), 
which again reflects a shift from a cartel to a mass party model. For the cartel party 
the boundary between members and supporters are fluid (as was historically the case 
in Fianna Fáil) with a main focus on state resources as a means of generating loyalty. 
In the mass party (less able to rely on external resources) members were actively 
recruited and encapsulated, with the organization putting an emphasis on both 
member rights and obligations (Katz and Mair, 1995: 18).  As already mentioned, 
Fianna Fáil members now for the first time have to pay a formal membership fee to 
the central party. Furthermore, members have to go through a newly introduced 
twelve months probation period, before being able to exercise their rights (Article 5); 
thus rights are only accessible if certain standards are met. As the party also wanted 
a more active membership, motions were passed at the 2012 ard fheis concerning 
annual activity plans for its sub-level organizations, as well as requiring members to 
attend at least two party meetings per year. This again puts into perspective what at 
first glance might be considered as reforms to empower members. The expansion of 
membership rights is only one component of an overall reform of organizational 
membership that also increases the costs of membership and conditions how rights 
can be used, a combination of measures that seems to strengthen the infrastructure 






We have argued in this article that Fianna Fáil historically resembled the cartel model 
of party organization, a party model developed as a successor to the mass party, a 
template to which Fianna Fáil, with its fluid organizational boundaries and 
decentralized candidate selection, has never neatly corresponded. Up to 2011, this 
resemblance intensified as the party – thanks to near permanent government access 
and, later on, availability of direct state funding – became increasingly dominated by 
its parliamentary arm. Taking extensive and on-going access to extra-organizational 
resources to generate loyalty for granted, ties to the extra-parliamentary organization 
(itself increasingly dominated by TDs’ personal networks) seemed dispensable. This 
perception was undermined by the 2011 election, which simultaneously led to an all-
time low of membership figures, calling into question the organization’s ability to 
survive altogether.  
The reforms that followed, at first glance, seemed to empower party members, 
but are better understood in conjunction with attempts to integrate the different 
arms of the party, with the party in central office playing a coordinating, if not 
controlling, role, shifting power away from TDs locally and nationally, thereby 
reinforcing centralization. Simply put, while prior to 2011 the ascendency of the party 
in public office – a core feature of the cartel model –  seemed to be the party’s defining 
feature, post-2011 Fianna Fáil altered its organization, adopting mass party features. 
Undoubtedly the reform granted members more formal rights in intra-organizational 
decision-making. While these rights seem to be more significant in practice regarding 
members’ ability to veto government participation than selecting candidates or 
leaders, the parliamentary party retains an important position, with the rights of both 
the latter and grass-roots members tied to new obligations, with both being more 
tightly integrated. Only since 2012 have TDs had to become members, while members 
have to pay a formal fee and go through a probation phase, with the central party 
having the power to employ a range of sanctions if obligations are violated. Rather 
than democratizing the party, the reforms suggest an aspiration to integrate the party 
organization as a whole, and to enhance Fianna Fáil’s ability to generate loyalty and 
control through organizational means, reducing the need to access state and 
government resources.  
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To what extent these formal shifts will lead to lasting changes of Fianna Fáil as 
an organization simultaneously operating outside and inside public institutions, or 
whether it will oscillate back towards cartel party features will depend on whether 
and how quickly it can return to power, allowing it to yet again rely on external 






Aylott, N. and N. Bolin (2016) Managed Intra-party Democracy: Precursory 
Delegation and Leadership Selection, Party Politics, (forthcoming). 
 
Bolleyer, N. (2009) ‘Inside the Cartel Party: Party Organisation in Government and 
Opposition’, Political Studies 57(3), pp. 579–99. 
Carty, R. K. (1981) Party and Parish Pump: Electoral Politics in Ireland. (Ontario: 
Wilfrid Laurier University Press). 
Carty, R.K. (2004) ‘Parties as Franchise Systems: The Stratarchical Organizational 
Imperative’ Party Politics 10 (1), pp. 5-24 
Chubb, B. (1972) The Government and Politics of Ireland. (London: Longman). 
Clancy, P. and N. O’Connor. 2011. ‘Public Appointments: Options for Reform’ Tasc 
Papers, July, 2011 
http://www.tasc.ie/download/pdf/tascpublicappointments.pdf [accessed 8 
November, 2016] 
Cross, W. (2016) Understanding Power-Sharing within Political Parties: Stratarchy as 
Mutual Interdependence between the Party in the Centre and the Party on the 
Ground, Government and Opposition, early view July 7 2016.  
 
Cross, W. and A. Blais (2012) Who Selects the Party Leader? Party Politics 18 (2): pp. 
127-150. 
 
Detterbeck, K. (2005) Cartel Parties in Western Europe? Party Politics 11 (2): 
pp. 173-191. 
 
Dunphy, R. (1995) The Making of Fianna Fáil Power in Ireland, 1922–48. (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press). 
 
Duverger, M. (1964) Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern 




Farrell, D. (1994) Ireland: Centralization. professionalization and competitive 
pressures’, in R.S. Katz and P. Mair (Eds.) How Parties Organize: Change and 
Adaptation in Party Organizations in Western Democracies, pp. 216–41 (London: 
Sage). 
 
Farrell, D. and C. Little (2013) External shocks, leadership replacement and party 
change. The case of Fianna Fáil. Paper Prepared for the APSA Annual Meeting, 
August 29, Chicago, US. 
Fianna Fáil (2012) Organisational Reform Proposals. (Fianna Fáil: Dublin). 
Gallagher, M. (1985) Political Parties in the Republic of Ireland. (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press. 
Gallagher, M. (2010) Parliamentary Parties and the Party Whips, in: M. MacCarthaigh 
and M. Manning (Eds.) The Houses of the Oireachtas. Parliament in Ireland, pp. 
129–53 (Dublin: Institute of Public Administration). 
Katz, R. S. and Mair, P. (1995) Changing Models of Party Organisation and Party 
Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party, Party Politics, 1 (1), 5–28. 
Katz, R. S. and Mair, P. (1996) Cadre, Catch-All or Cartel? A Rejoinder, Party Politics, 2 
(4), pp. 525–34. 
Katz, R. S. and Mair, P. (2002) The Ascendancy of the Party in Public Office: Party 
Organisational Change in Twentieth-Century Democracy, in: R. Gunther, J. 
Ramón-Montero and J. J. Linz (Eds.),Political Parties, Old Concepts and New 
Challenges,  pp. 113–35 (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
Kelly, F. (2015) Fianna Fáil to vote on coalition with old enemy Fine Gael, The Irish 
Times, April 11. 
Koole R. (1996) Party. Cadre, Catch-all or Cartel? : A Comment on the Notion of the 
Cartel, Party Politics 2 4), pp. 507-523. 
27 
 
Leahy, P. (2009) Showtime. The inside story of Fianna Fáil in power (London: 
Penguin). 
Loughlin, E. (2015) Fianna Fáil members rebel over gender quota rule. The Irish 
Examiner, November 1. 
Mair, P. (1987a) The Changing Irish Party System (London: Pinter). 
Mair, P. (1987b) Party Organisation, Vote Management, and Candidate Selection: 
Towards the Nationalization of Electoral Strategy in Ireland, in: H. P. Penniman 
and B. Farrell (Eds.) Ireland at the Polls 1981, 1982, and 1987. A Study of Four 
General Elections, pp.  104–30 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press). 
McGee, H. (2011) Fianna Fáil has lost the local knowledge. The grassroots are not 
being listened to, The Irish Times, 27 August, 
McGraw, S. (2015). How parties win. Shaping the Irish political arena. (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press). 
Murphy, Ronan J. and Farrell, David M. (2002) Party Politics in Ireland: Regularizing a 
Volatile System, in: P. Webb, D.M. Farrell and I. Holliday (Eds.) Political Parties in 
Advanced Industrial Democracies, pp. 217–47 (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
O’Connell, H. (2015) ‘It was out of control’: Chaos in Longford as Fianna Fáil 
members denied a vote, Thejournal.ie, October 30. 
O’Malley, E., S. Quinlan, and P. Mair  (2012) Party Patronage in Ireland: Changing 
Parameters, in P. Kopecky, P. Mair and M. Spirova (eds) Party Patronage and 
Party Government in European Democracies, Oxford: Oxford UP. 
Rafter, K. (1999) New proposals on structure of FF aim to overhaul cumann system, 
The Irish Times, 23 September. 
Reid, L. (2005) Fianna Fáil faces crisis in party’s structure, says report, The Irish 
Times, 11 May. 
28 
 
Standards in Public Office Commission (various years). Exchequer funding received by 
political parties. Dublin: Standards in Public Office Commission. 
 
Walsh, D. (1986). The Party. Inside Fianna Fáil. Dublin: Gill & Macmillan. 
 
Weeks, L. (2014), ‘Party Membership Figures. Ireland 1979-2014’. MAPP Project Data  
       Archive [www.projectmapp.eu]. 
 
 
